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A B S T R A C T   
Information on ship traffic on the Northern Sea Route (NSR) has been lacking. Previous studies have analyzed 
transit shipping via the NSR, but no data has been available on the overall traffic volume (number of voyages) 
and the magnitude and characteristics of domestic and destination shipping. Information on shipping trends and 
the role of Russian and non-Russian shipping companies in ongoing shipping operations has been incomplete. 
This study provides such statistical data and evaluation of traffic on the NSR during 2016–2019 and discusses 
policy implications for future NSR shipping. The study shows that Russian domestic shipping dominates shipping 
activities on the NSR in terms of number of shipping companies, vessels and voyages. There are much fewer 
Asian shipping companies working on the NSR than European companies, contrary to media reports that often 
depict a large Asian shipping influence on the NSR. Much more frequent voyages are also taking place between 
the NSR and European ports than ports in the Asian Pacific region. Developing logistics operations involve year- 
round shipments of commodities from remote locations within the NSR to ice-free transshipment and storage 
hubs located outside the NSR, but within Russia.   
1. Introduction 
Ship traffic is increasing in the Arctic, facilitated by rapid reduction 
in sea ice cover and ice thickness as a result of global warming, resulting 
in greater marine access and longer navigation seasons. The main eco-
nomic driver for this increased shipping activity in the Arctic is natural 
resource exploitation and global market demands for commodities. 
The nature of this shipping activity is not always well understood. 
The Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment [1] provided 
the first overview of circumpolar Arctic shipping based on collected ship 
traffic data from the Arctic states for 2004. The aim was to quantify the 
number of voyages and better understand the potential environmental 
impacts of Arctic marine shipping operations. Eriksen and Olsen [2] and 
Eguiluz et al. [3] did a similar circumpolar study by examining shipping 
activity in the Arctic between 2010 and 2015, and Silber and Adams [4] 
between 2015 and 2017, based on Automatic Identification System 
(AIS) data. Again the aim was to identify areas where shipping con-
centrates and provide monthly and yearly assessments of the spatial 
distribution of ship density in the circumpolar Arctic. 
More information is available on ship traffic on the Northwest Pas-
sage in the Canadian Arctic [5–7] than along the Northeast Passage and 
the Northern Sea Route (NSR) off the northern coast of Russia (Fig. 1). 
Only a handful of studies have assessed recent ship traffic on the NSR 
and then only for international transit voyages [8–14] which are only a 
very small fraction of the overall shipping activity taking place on the 
NSR as this study clearly demonstrates. 
Zhang et al. [14] pointed out the lack of ship traffic analysis and 
information on what is exactly happening on the NSR. They also stressed 
the need to fill the gap between economic viability studies and actual 
ship traffic statistics on the NSR by identifying key players and shipping 
patterns. Zhang et al. [15] stated that present lack of ship traffic data is 
making it difficult to both identify and quantify risks compared to the 
traditional routes via the Suez Canal. Recently Li and Otsuka [16] pro-
vided in a conference paper more comprehensive information on ship-
ping activities on the NSR, including ship types, the range in deadweight 
tonnage and daily ship positioning between 2013 and 2017, based on 
data from the Russian Northern Sea Route Administration (NSRA). 
This article’s main objective is to provide an empirical update and 
quantify and evaluate ship traffic and traffic flow on the NSR during 
2016–2019 and determine the significance of domestic shipping, desti-
nation shipping, and international transit shipping in the overall ship-
ping activities. The second objective is to assess the role of Russian and 
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non-Russian shipping companies in NSR shipping. The final objective is 
to show developing shipping trends, identify the main drivers for 
ongoing and future shipping and highlight some policy implications for 
future development of the NSR’s transport system. 
With projected rapid increase of ship traffic on the NSR, it is hoped 
that the study will provide a baseline or reference point for evaluation of 
future changes in shipping activities on the NSR. The goal is to give 
maritime businesses, researchers, governmental authorities, policy-
makers and other Arctic stakeholders a better understanding of recent 
shipping activities and what this could mean for future Arctic shipping. 
In a forthcoming article recent developments in maritime logistics on the 
NSR will be further analyzed and discussed. 
The article is structured in such a way that Session 2 describes the 
methodology; Session 3 evaluates ship traffic flow and traffic charac-
teristics on the NSR in 2016–2019; Session 4 discusses the developing 
shipping trends and future prospects of shipping on the NSR; and Session 
5 presents the main conclusion. 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Data sources and methods 
The empirical data for this study comes from two separate datasets: 
1) The Centre for High North Logistics’ NSR Shipping Database, 
managed by the CHNL Information Office in Murmansk. The database is 
based on satellite AIS data provided by the Canadian satellite company 
exactEarth; and 2) an official list of registered vessels working on the 
NSR each year provided by NSRA in Moscow, which includes key vessel 
characteristics such as vessel type and ice class, ship owner/operator 
and daily reports of vessels’ geographic locations near and within the 
NSR Water Area. Additional information on vessels’ characteristics 
came from online ship registry databases. 
Due to current limited shipping activity on the NSR compared to 
most other sea areas, all vessels’ AIS transmissions were processed 
manually in real-time and downloaded to a database. All vessels that 
were officially registered working on the NSR were monitored and de-
tails of all their voyages recorded (AIS signals recorded every 5–20 min). 
This included the time and place of each vessel’s port of origin; the 
location, time and date of entry to the NSR and departure from the NSR; 
The Northern Sea Routea
b
Fig. 1. a: The NSR Water Area extends from 
the meridian of Cape Zhelaniya and along the 
east coast of the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago in 
the west, and from the Line of Maritime 
Demarcation between Russia and the U.S.A and 
Cape Dezhnev in the Bering Strait in the east. 
The total distance between the two borders is 
about 5600 kilometers. b: Sailing tracks of 
vessels operating on the NSR in 2018 based on 
AIS data. Greatest shipping activity and the 
only year-round activity is between the SW 
Kara Sea and Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and 
several ports in NW Europe. 
(source: CHNL Information Office).   
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the actual sailing information en route; and the time and place of arrival 
to the destination port (origin-destination, OD pairs). This information 
was then used to determine the total number of vessels and voyages on 
the NSR and the number of domestic, destination and international 
transit voyages over the four years. This included recording the names 
and nationalities of ship owners/operators working on the NSR. The 
recorded AIS transmissions were also used to map the actual sailing 
tracks of vessels. 
The study benefitted from consultation with several shipping com-
panies working on the NSR, including the Russian nuclear icebreaking 
operator Atomflot. As secondary sources of information, several internet 
sources were used in clarifying the nature of various shipping activities 
during the four years - on ship companies’ websites, maritime news-
letters, trade journals and press releases. 
2.2. Study area and definitions 
The area of study is the NSR Water Area (hereafter NSR) along the 
northern coast of Russia as defined in the Merchant Shipping Code of the 
Russian Federation of 1999 (Fig. 1). 
The following definitions apply to this study. Voyage: If a ship leaves 
a port and arrives at another port (or in another area, e.g. for a research 
vessel that does not call at a port) then this is considered one voyage. 
When the same vessel departs from the first port or water area and 
returns to another port or destination then this becomes a second 
voyage. Voyage on the NSR: A voyage that originates from within the 
NSR, arrives to the NSR, or transits the NSR. These restrictions are the 
same as used by Russian authorities in assessing ship traffic and cargo 
volume on the NSR. This means that ship traffic within the Barents Sea 
(including the Pechora and White Seas) that does not cross the western 
board of the NSR at Novaya Zemlya is not considered here, and the same 
applies for ship traffic in the Bering Sea that does not cross the Bering 
Strait, as these seas are outside the defined borders of the NSR. Subse-
quently, crude oil transport from both Varandey terminal and the Prir-
azlomnaya oil platform (both in the Pechora Sea) to Murmansk are not 
included in this study. 
A domestic voyage on the NSR is a voyage between two Russian ports/ 
locations. A destination voyage on the NSR is a voyage between a Russian 
port and a non-Russian port. A transit voyage on the NSR is a voyage via 
the NSR crossing both the western and eastern borders of the NSR 
without calling at intermediate ports/locations along the route. An in-
ternational transit voyage on the NSR is a voyage between two non- 
Russian ports via the NSR. The summer-autumn navigational season on 
the NSR extends from the beginning of July to the end of November (5 
months). The winter-spring navigational season extends from the begin-
ning of January to the end of June plus December (7 months). 
3. Results: ship traffic on the NSR in 2016–2019 
3.1. Background 
Russia regulates all shipping on the NSR. Russia does this based on 
Article 234 of UNGLOS but also on historical grounds which defines the 
NSR as a national unified transport route of the Russian Federation (see 
[17,18]). Article 234 gives Arctic coastal states the right to adopt and 
enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, 
reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered 
areas in the Arctic within the limits of their exclusive economic zone. 
Russia’s interpretation of UNCLOS 234 has been contested by some 
states. Shipping companies planning to sail the NSR must apply for a 
permit to Russia’s Northern Sea Route Administration (NSRA). The 
administration determines whether icebreaker escort is required or if the 
ship can navigate independently, based on the navigational season, ice 
conditions, and the vessel’s ice class (see details in [19]). 
The number of officially registered vessels working on the NSR each 
year is significantly less than the number of shipping permits granted by 
the NSRA ([20]; Table 1). A large majority of vessels with permits but 
not officially registered as actually sailing on the NSR are Russian river 
vessels including barges, dredgers, tugboats, floating cranes and rafts 
that very likely never entered the NSR, but still apply for permits each 
year. Additionally, such vessels do likely not have the technical ability to 
provide required daily reporting to the NSRA in Moscow and are not 
equipped with AIS transmitters. Some registered vessels applied for 
more than one permit and a few foreign flagged vessels with permits but 
not registered probably cancelled their scheduled voyages. In any case, 
the number of sailing permits is a very poor indicator of maritime 
shipping activity on the NSR. 
3.2. Ship traffic statistics on the NSR in 2016–2019 
3.2.1. Vessels, voyages and cargo volumes 
A total of 8329 separate voyages took place on the NSR in 
2016–2019. The number of vessels working on the NSR each year ranged 
between 227 and 297 and the number of voyages increased from 1705 to 
2694, or by 58%. The increase in the number of voyages during the four 
years was the result of increased internal traffic on the NSR (by mainly 
service/supply vessels and icebreakers) as well as increase in destination 
shipping between SW Kara Sea and European ports (by LNG carriers and 
gas condensate tankers). Table 1 shows the number of voyages by de-
parture and arrival destination and Fig. 2 the number of vessels and 
voyages per month. Majority of voyages took place between July and 
October. Less than 50 vessels were working during the winter-spring 
season on the NSR and only within the SW Kara Sea, the Ob Bay and 
Yenisei River. 
During the four years the cargo volume on the NSR increased from 
7.5 million tons in 2016–31.5 million tons in 2019, a 4-fold increase 
(Fig. 3). Most of the cargo was for export to the European market con-
sisting of liquid hydrocarbons supplied by two natural resource projects 
in the Ob Bay - LNG and gas condensate from the Yamal LNG plant at the 
port of Sabetta and crude oil from the Arctic Gate terminal at Cape 
Kammeniy (Novy Port) further south in the Ob Bay. In 2019, 254 
shipments of LNG were brought from Sabetta by 23 LNG carriers to 
foreign markets and 41 shipments of gas condensate by 6 tankers. In 
addition comes transport of prefabricated LNG modules for the con-
struction of the Yamal LNG plant, delivered to the port of Sabetta in 
2016 and 2017, 
Cargo on the NSR had peaked in 1987 at 6.6 million tons, but 
declined sharply with the dissolution of the Soviet Union to about 1.6 
million tons in 1996 (Fig. 3). Prior to 2016 majority of the cargo was 
deliveries of supplies, construction materials, equipment and fuels to 
Table 1 
Ship traffic activity (number of voyages) on the NSR in 2016–2019.  
Departure and arrival destinations 2016 2017 2018 2019 
From NSR to Russian ports  599  591  564  646 
From western Russian ports to NSR  576  537  537  609 
From eastern Russian ports to NSR  46  30  33  44 
Between NSR ports  263  580  563  736 
From NSR to European ports  78  62  144  287 
From European ports to NSR  65  63  137  272 
From NSR to NE Asian ports  15  4  4  21 
From NE Asian ports to NSR  36  9  10  25 
Transits via NSR (total)  18  28  27  37 
Domestic transitsa  5  12  8  15 
Destination transitsb  5  4  2  8 
International transits  8  12  17  14 
Other departure/arrival destinations  9  4  3  17 
Total number of voyages  1705  1908  2022  2694 
Total number of different vessels  297  283  227  278 
Total number of shipping companies  129  121  90  119 
Total number of sailing permits (NSRA)  718  644  792  799  
a Domestic transits are transit voyages on the NSR between two Russian ports. 
b Destination transits are transit voyages on the NSR between a Russian port 
and a non-Russian port. 
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remote Arctic communities (referred to as “northern deliveries”) during 
the summer-autumn season; construction material and equipment for 
port development at Sabetta (which started in summer 2012); and year- 
round deliveries since 1978 of nickel, copper and other non-ferrous ores 
and metals from the port of Dudinka (Nornickel) on the Yenisei River to 
Murmansk, and occasionally directly to European markets. 
Total cargo transported on international transit voyages during the 
four years amounted to only 980,676 tons (Fig. 3). 
3.2.2. Domestic shipping 
Domestic shipping was the dominant type of shipping activity on the 
NSR with 87% of all voyages in 2016, 92% in 2017, 84% in 2018 and 
76% in 2019 (Table 1 and Fig. 4). 
Of the four coastal seas along the NSR, the Kara Sea/Ob Bay is by far 
the most frequent shipping destination (Table 2 and Fig. 1). The main 
ship traffic was between the NSR and the western Russian ports of 
Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. Highlighting the importance of both 
Murmansk and Arkhangelsk for the NSR, the two service and supply 
hubs (and transshipment in the case of Murmansk) were either depar-
ture or arrival destinations of 50% of all voyages on the NSR in 2018. 
Most of these voyages were to or from the port of Sabetta and the Arctic 
Gate oil terminal at Cape Kamenniy in the Ob Bay, and the port of 
Dudinka on the Yenisei River (Fig. 5). Crude oil from Cape Kamenniy 
and non-ferrous metals from Dudinka are first shipped to Murmansk 
before onward deliveries to European markets. Both Murmansk and 
Arkhangelsk were the delivery ports of construction materials, equip-
ment, machinery, and supplies for the construction of the port of 
Sabetta, upgrading of the port of Pevek in the East Siberian Sea, and for 
the construction of several remote military bases on Russian Arctic 
islands and archipelagos. In 2019 similar work started for construction 
of the Utrenniy terminal for the Arctic LNG-2 project on the Gydan 
Peninsula in the Ob Bay. 
Other frequent destinations on the NSR during the summer-autumn 
season were Dikson on the Kara Sea; Tiksi, Khatanga, Yana River, and 
Cape Bykov bordering the Laptev Sea; and Pevek and Cape Zeleniy 
bordering the East Siberian Sea (Table 2). 






























































Fig. 3. Cargo tonnage transported on the NSR between 1933 and 2019. Rapid 
increase in cargo turnover starting in 2016 is due to transport of liquid hy-
drocarbons for export, primarily to the European market. Inserted diagram 
shows the cargo tonnage on international transit voyages in 2016–2019. 
(source: NSRA). 
Fig. 4. The share of domestic shipping, destination shipping and international transit shipping on the NSR in 2016–2019. Same key as in Fig. 2.  
Table 2 
Number of port-of-calls/arrivals to the Russian Arctic coastal seas and rivers 
along the NSR (see Fig. 1).  
Arrival locations 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Kara Sea  96  174  185  235 
Gulf of Ob  504  483  558  901 
Yenisei River  105  97  90  96 
Ob River  2  6  0  3 
Irtysh River  1  7  5  5 
Laptev Sea  88  129  167  139 
Lena River  25  42  29  26 
Yana River  7  12  20  28 
Khatanga River  2  19  9  12 
Anabar River  6  13  7  15 
East Siberian Sea  76  121  124  138 
Kolyma River  20  45  58  52 
Indigirka River  4  0  0  0 
Chukchi Sea  22  56  30  42 
Total number of calls  958  1204  1282  1692 
Different locations  51  84  62  61  
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shipping companies working on the NSR in 2016–2019, and owned/ 
operated 66–83% of all vessels and made 75–87% of all voyages on the 
NSR (Fig. 6). 
European companies were also participants in domestic shipping 
(cabotage) on the NSR, with up to 23 companies working each year and 
making a total of 269 voyages during the four years. These companies 
provided general cargo vessels, bulkers, heavy lift carriers, and offshore 
support vessels. Most of these voyages were between Murmansk and 
Sabetta and locations offshore in the Kara Sea and in the Ob Bay. Nor-
wegian shipping companies operated service and supply vessels in the 
Kara Sea in support of drilling operations, and companies from 
Luxembourg, Netherlands and Belgium provided dredging services in 
the Ob Bay in 2016–2017. Chinese company operated a drilling rig. 
3.2.3. Destination shipping 
Destination shipping on the NSR was 12% of all voyages in 2016, 8% 
in 2017, 15% in 2018, and 23% in 2019 (Table 1 and Fig. 4). 
From 2016–2019 there were 1232 destination voyages on the NSR: 
1108 between the NSR and European ports, and 124 between the NSR 
and Asian ports. The NSR port of origin/destination was almost exclu-
sively Sabetta in the Ob Bay. The number of European shipping com-
panies/operators is also much greater than the number of Asian 
companies (Fig. 6). In 2016 and 2017 most of these voyages were de-
liveries of prefabricated LNG modules and other project cargo by heavy 
lift carriers and general cargo vessels for the Yamal LNG plant at the port 
of Sabetta. These project shipments were completed in September 2017. 
Though the LNG modules were initially shipped from several construc-
tion yards in China and Indonesia most were transported by European 
shipping companies via the Suez Route to Sabetta, or first to Zeebrugge 
in Belgium and some other European ports, before onward shipment to 
Sabetta. Several shipments also came through the Bering Strait during 
the summer-autumn season. The majority of the European companies 
transporting heavy lift cargos to Sabetta were from the Netherlands (e. 
g., in 2016: 6 Dutch companies with 26 heavy lift vessels making 80 
voyages to and from Sabetta) followed by companies from Germany. 
The sharp increase in the number of voyages between the NSR and 
European ports starting in 2018 (Table 1 and Fig. 4) was due to ship-
ments of LNG (and gas condensate) from the Yamal LNG plant at the port 
of Sabetta to western European ports for LNG unloading or trans-
shipment, and return voyages back to Sabetta. First such shipment took 
place in late December 2017. To avoid sailing high ice-class (Arc7) LNG 
carriers, which for a while were in short supply, all the way to western 
European ports, ship-to-ship transshipment of LNG to conventional 
carriers before transport to West European ports started in November 
2018 near Honningsvåg off the northern coast of Norway, lasting until 
the end of June 2019 (Fig. 5). No similar transshipment of LNG has yet 
taken place before shipment via the eastern route to the Asian Pacific 
market. Only four deliveries of LNG were shipped from Sabetta to NE 
Asia in 2018 during the summer-autumn season, which increased to 20 
deliveries in 2019 (in addition to one shipment of non-ferrous metals 
Fig. 5. Sailing tracks of vessels in SW Kara Sea in 2018 based on AIS data. Russian nuclear icebreakers assisted cargo vessels sailing between the SW Kara Sea and the 
Ob Bay and Yenisei River during the winter-spring season. 
(source: CHNL Information Office). 
Fig. 6. Number of Russian, European and Asian shipping companies/operators on the NSR and their vessels and voyages in 2016–2019. Same key as in Fig. 2.  
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from the port of Dudinka). 
Unlike transport of crude oil from Cape Kamenniy and non-ferrous 
metals from Dudinka which are transported by Russian shipping com-
panies to Murmansk, shipments of LNG and gas condensate from Sabetta 
are almost inclusively being done by non-Russian companies on a long- 
term charter contracts (Fig. 7). These companies transporting Russian 
LNG are from Greece (Dynagas), UK (Teekay Shipping; LNG operations 
run from the UK) and Japan (Mitsui O.S.K. Lines). All three companies 
made joint ventures (JVs) with subsidiaries of China’s COSCO Shipping 
for financing the construction costs of their new fleet of Arc7 LNG car-
riers. Transport of gas condensate from Sabetta to the European market 
was done by companies from Greece and Germany. 
3.2.4. International transit shipping 
International transit voyages via the NSR were only 8 in 2016, 12 in 
2017, 17 in 2018 and 14 in 2019; or 0.4–0.8% of all the voyages during 
each year (Table 1 and Fig. 4). 
Of the 51 international transit voyages during the four years, 47 
carried cargo totaling 980,676 tons (Fig. 3). Most of the cargo originated 
in Asia (28 voyages or 60%) and primarily from China (19 voyages). A 
total of 29 voyages transported general cargo, 4 with paper pulp and 5 
with frozen fish or meat. Four voyages originated in Canada (2 with coal 
from Vancouver, and 2 with iron ore from Baffin Island, Nunavut: 
304,699 tons combined). 
Here Asian companies are in the leading role, with the Chinese 
shipping company COSCO Shipping Specialized Carriers with 23 voy-
ages or 45% of all international transits during the four years, follow by 
German companies with 25%. Additionally, COSCO made 2 transits in 
2019 between western Russian ports and China and Vietnam. All in-
ternational transits except two have been between NE Asian Pacific ports 
(China, Japan and South-Korea) and ports in NW Europe (the five Nordic 
countries, Germany, UK, Netherlands and France). The exceptions are 
two shipments of coal from Vancouver, Canada to Finland in 2016. Most 
of the vessels have been general cargo vessels and heavy lift carriers 
transporting project cargo including wind power equipment (Fig. 3). 
4. Policy implications for future NSR shipping 
4.1. Regular year-round shipping is limited on the NSR 
NSR is not open for shipping on a year-round basis except from the 
Ob Bay and Yenisei River westwards via the Kara Sea. Lack of year- 
round shipping possibilities along the full length of the NSR is a major 
problem for Russia’s Arctic natural resource exploitation as future 
commodities are primarily meant for the Asian Pacific market. Also in-
ternational shipping companies that might be interested in using the 
route regularly as a shortcut in transporting goods between NE Asia and 
NW Europe will not consider changing their transport and logistics 
system for a route that is only open part of the year. 
But Russia is eager to open up the route to NE Asia for its abundant 
Arctic natural resources. Russia is already constructing three 60 MW 
LK60-type nuclear icebreakers and two more to follow. In addition three 
120 MW Lider-type nuclear icebreakers are being planned, with the first 
one scheduled to be operational in 2028. All these powerful nuclear 
icebreakers are scheduled to operate in the more ice-infected eastern 
part of the NSR [21] making regular year-round shipping possible along 
the whole length of the NSR within the next 8–10 years. This timeframe 
could be shortened by further reduction in sea ice coverage and ice 
thickness during the winter and spring in the eastern part of the NSR and 
by improved icebreaking technology. 
4.2. Domestic shipping is the dominant type of shipping activity on the 
NSR 
Domestic shipping is the dominant type of shipping activity on the 
NSR in terms of number of voyages, with 76–92% of all voyages in 
2016–2019. This is likely to continue to be the case in the foreseeable 
future. 
Increasingly over the next several years domestic shipping on the 
NSR will bring large quantities of Russian Arctic oil, LNG, coal, metals, 
ore, grain and other natural resources on high ice-class cargo vessels 
from remote locations along the NSR to larger Russian hubs or dedicated 
transshipment terminals for temporary storage and transshipment. 
These hubs or terminals will be in ice-free waters outside the defined 
borders of the NSR and from there the commodities will be exported on 
conventional vessels to foreign markets. 
Increased domestic shipping will also be a result of geological and 
geophysical exploration of Russian Arctic seas and coastal areas and in 
establishing, servicing, and maintaining current and future energy and 
mineral mining projects in the remote regions of the Russian Arctic. This 
includes several planned LNG and gas condensate project in the Ob Bay. 
Shipping on the NSR is of high strategic and economic significance 
for Russia as a transport corridor along its whole Arctic coastline and as 
a gateway to the North Atlantic Ocean in the west and to the North- 
Pacific Ocean in the east. As such, the route ties together the western 
and northern parts of the Russian Federation with its far eastern part in 
the North Pacific, which is of strategic importance to Russia. Marine 
transport (together with limited air transport) is also the only delivery 
route for goods, supplies and fuels for nearly 100 remote inhabited lo-
calities on the Russian mainland Arctic coast, archipelagos, and islands. 
The same applies for Arctic communities along Russia’s inland water-
ways, which are dependent on river transport. 
Domestic shipping on the NSR will play a significant role in the 
Russian government’s future socio-economic development of remote 
Russian Arctic territories [22]. The Russian government has established 
eight Arctic development zones along its northern boarders and has 
suggested several priority infrastructure projects (e.g., ports, terminals, 
railways, airports and power transmission facilities) within these zones 
[23,24]. The proposed infrastructure projects are in support of increased 
natural resource exploitation and will require year-round maritime 
transport of energy and mineral commodities [25]. But as discussed by 
Tschudi [26] Russia holds great abundance of energy and mineral re-
sources within the same geographical locations (“where gas meets ore”) 
which opens up future possibilities for more value-adding industrial 
processing in situ before shipments along the NSR. 
Domestic shipping will also more than other modes of transport in-
crease the Russian presence in the Arctic which is strategically import 
for Russia in terms of national security. This includes servicing and 
maintaining several security/military bases, search and rescue facilities, 
and boarder guard and surveillance stations in the Russian Arctic region. 
Infrastructure projects that provide both critical transport infrastructure 
and at the same time strengthen Russia’s security/military presence are 
favored by the Russian government [27]. 
To strengthen the role of Russian shipping industry and shipping 
Fig. 7. Non-Russian shipping companies with the greatest numbers of voyages 
on the NSR in 2016–2019. Same key as in Fig. 2. Note: Teekay Shipping is here 
listed as an UK company, but the headquarters are in the Bahamas and the 
company is usually considered a Canadian company but LNG operations are run 
from the UK. 
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companies operating in Arctic waters, the Russian government drafted 
amendments to the Russian Merchant Shipping Code that only allow 
Russian flag vessels to transport Russian hydrocarbon resources within 
NSR borders. This law came into force on February 1, 2018. These 
regulations did not directly impact shipping activities in the period 
under study here as foreign flag vessels on long-term contracts which 
were agreed on before this date were except from this requirement. But 
the regulations will have major future implications for foreign cargo 
vessels servicing new energy projects along the NSR. Another suggested 
Russian regulation would additionally require all vessels carrying hy-
drocarbons on the NSR to be built in Russian shipyards. These laws and 
regulations set the tone for Russia’s increasing control of future shipping 
on the NSR with its natural resources. 
4.3. Future reductions to destination shipping on the NSR 
Destination shipping on the NSR was 8–23% of voyages in 
2016–2019. Though the share of destination shipping between the NSR 
and European and Asian Pacific destinations has increased during the 
last two years and in particular in terms of cargo volume, there will be 
future reductions in the number of registered voyages in this category. 
This is despite increasing volume of commodities being transported from 
the NSR. 
Currently, destination shipping on the NSR involves direct transport 
of LNG from the Yamal LNG plant at Sabetta to Europe and NE Asia as 
well as deliveries of gas condensate to Europe (combined about 300 
shipments or 600 voyages per year). This transportation scheme will 
permanently change as soon as Russia’s Novatek has constructed its 
scheduled transshipment and storage facilities for LNG on both the Kola 
Peninsula near Murmansk in the Barents Sea in the west, and on the 
Kamchatka Peninsula in the North Pacific in the east [28]. Both trans-
shipment terminals are scheduled to start operations in 2023. In the 
meantime, temporary ship-to-ship transshipment of LNG to European 
destinations will be relocated from Honningsvåg off the northern coast 
of Norway to a site near Kildin Island close to Murmansk. These logis-
tical changes will reduce the number of voyages in the destination 
shipping category and correspondingly increase the number of voyages 
registered as domestic voyages on the NSR. 
The second important component of destination shipping on the NSR 
are shipments with project cargos for large-scale Russian Arctic energy 
and mining projects on heavy lift carriers from Asian Pacific and Euro-
pean ports (e.g., upcoming Arctic LNG 2 and other LNG projects in the 
Ob Bay). 
Russia may not be as dependent on foreign companies for both the 
construction and shipment of prefabricated modules and other project 
cargos for future Arctic projects, as it was for the Yamal LNG. The ex-
periences gained from the Yamal LNG project has enabled Russia to 
speed up its own LNG project development. According to President 
Vladimir Putin, Russia will strive to become the world’s largest LNG 
producer [29]. To reach the president’s goal, Russia needs to put much 
more emphasis on LNG technologies, engineering and plant 
manufacturing. To increase its share in the construction phase of future 
LNG projects, Russia’s Novatek is building the Kola Yard facility near 
Murmansk, due to be completed by 2023, to manufacture large pre-
fabricated structural units and gravitational platforms for several up-
coming LNG projects. 
Destination shipping will therefore likely play less of a role in 
transporting future LNG modules and project cargo from outside Russia 
to locations within the NSR, increasingly overtaken by Russia’s own 
manufacturing facilities and yards. This development is likely to take 
several years, though. In the meantime, Russia will still be dependent on 
foreign shipping companies for heavy project cargo deliveries and 
foreign yards for module construction. 
Project cargo from foreign ports transported on river barges up 
Russia’s waterways to industrial sites in the southern part of Russia is 
also likely to grow in the near future. These shipments will only take 
place during the summer-autumn season. The sailing window on Sibe-
rian rivers is only about three to four months, before they start freezing 
over again. Same applies for river transport of commodities from inland 
Russian territories to Arctic ports and onward shipments to Asian Pacific 
markets. 
As was evident in 2016 and 2017 destination shipping with project 
cargo is project-specific and short-term in nature, without steady heavy 
cargo traffic and long-term transport contracts. 
4.4. Several challenges for international transit shipping via the NSR 
Since the shipment of iron ore from Kirkenes in northern Norway to 
Lianyungang in China in September 2010, the number of international 
transit voyages have ranged from 1 to 17 per year, during the summer- 
autumn season. During 2016–2019 the numbers were 8–17 or 0.4–0.8% 
of voyages each year. All international transit voyages on the NSR can be 
said to be exploratory in nature or demonstrations, but an effective way 
to evaluate commercial possibilities of NSR as a possible future trade 
route. But beyond this first step, international transit shipping is pro-
gressing very slowly. 
Year-round container shipping on the NSR between NE Asia and NW 
Europe will be a prerequisite for the route’s full integration into the 
world’s transportation system. Several authors have pointed out the 
challenges for the development of such a container shipping business on 
the NSR (e.g. [30,31]). One obvious obstacle are the ice conditions 
which are much more severe during winter-spring in the eastern part of 
the NSR [32] than in the westernmost part where year-round shipping is 
already taking place. But Russia’s plan is to open up the eastern part of 
the NSR for transport of commodities to the Asian Pacific market within 
the next 8–10 years with support from several powerful nuclear ice-
breakers. This opening will be able to accommodate international 
transits. 
Strong support from Russia in promoting international transit ship-
ping will be needed, both through direct infrastructure investments and 
by establishing international cooperation on NSR transit shipping. 
Russia has initiated such cooperation with China’s COSCO and with the 
Japanese Mitsui O.S.K Lines [33]. Russia would also need to provide 
reliable and efficient communication and navigational support services 
for transit navigation, including reliable icebreaker support [34]. But 
currently and likely for the foreseeable future, Russia’s focus is on its 
own Arctic energy and mineral development projects, not in servicing 
foreign vessels on international transit voyages. 
5. Conclusion 
Domestic shipping is the dominant type of shipping activity on the 
NSR and large majority of vessels are operated by Russian shipping 
companies. The ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk are acting as key 
service, supply and transshipment hubs for NSR shipping. Despite 
rapidly increasing shipping activity, year-round shipping is only taking 
place in the westernmost part of the NSR, in the SW Kara Sea, the Ob Bay 
and on the Yenisei River. Considerably more voyages are currently 
taking place between NSR and European ports than between NSR and 
ports in NE Asia. The number of European shipping companies operating 
vessels on the NSR is also much higher than Asian shipping companies. 
Russia’s focus is on natural resource exploitation in its Arctic territory, 
not on international transit shipping. Construction of transshipment 
hubs and other maritime infrastructure in support of Russian Arctic 
natural resource exploitation may though directly or indirectly benefit 
future development of international transit shipping via the NSR. 
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